Post-Quantum Cryptography: How to Secure Data Before Quantum Computers Break It

Post-Quantum Cryptography: How to Secure Data Before Quantum Computers Break It

The panic in the corridors of cybersecurity is actually increasing in a rather low-key manner – and it is not on phishing or ransomware. It is quantum computing. Although the possibility to change medicine and logistics to the next level makes it interesting to most of the people, there is a more sinister aspect of this next-gen technology that is already making IT leaders lose sleep. Imagine that all the files we have ever encrypted, all the bank transfer activities and all the secret communications suddenly become readable in a matter of minutes. But post-quantum cryptography is not some far-future science fiction scheme; it is the protection wall we sorely need to construct before the damus surfs.

So why is this change not only important, but it is also inevitable?

Why Current Encryption Won’t Survive the Quantum Age

Digital security today is based on mathematical problems that are difficult to solve on a classical computer RSA, elliptic curve cryptography and Diffie-Hellman. Breaking algorithms by use of current machines will require thousands of years. However, soon quantum computers, which the algorithms such as the one by Shor might be used, will enable to decrypt it in hours or even in minutes. In December 2023, IBM unveiled the Condor chip with 1,121 qubits, or a massive increase over 127 it demonstrated a mere two years earlier. And the Sycamore processor Google already reached quantum supremacy in 2019. Quantum future is not years away; no, it is knocking at the door.

The Global Risks Report 2025 released by the World Economic Forum shows that more than two-thirds (63.4 percent) of cybersecurity professionals think massive quantum-based attacks would be a reality by the early 2030s. And here is the twist of it all bad guys are already sowing encrypted data as we speak and as we know they will keep data because they can decrypt it when it comes out. This strategy is known as harvest now, decrypt later and is a very real threat. We are mortgaging the present in locks the future has already got keys to.

Post-Quantum Cryptography: Building Resilience Before It’s Too Late

Post-quantum cryptography (PQ McC) is nothing more than the redesign of our cryptographic systems to resist both classical and quantum computer attack. Algorithms seeking protection by PQC started being evaluated by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as early as 2016. In 2022 NIST picked four algorithms to standardize that had been vetted over several years by the international community, and include lattice-based tools such as CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based encryption algorithm, and Dilithium, a lattice-based digital signature algorithm. Experts expect to launch the final standards in 2025.

Thinking ahead companies are already trying it on. In 2023, Google did trials on Chrome browsers with encrypted HTTPS connection using Kyber. Amazon Web Services has been secretly building PQC into it KMS (Key Management Service). In the meantime, the NSA has required that by 2030 all federal systems adopt the use of quantum-safe encryption under its CNSA 2.o directive.

Small-scale adoption is already in place, but mass transition? The real challenge will be that.

Is the Organization prepared? Most Aren’t.

There are still lots of aspects that are lagging far behind. A report released by Deloitte in 2024 indicated that only 18 percent of the large organizations had even started cataloging their cryptographic resources, much less plotting a PQC migration. The obstacles are obvious:

  • Cost: PQC necessitates the substitution of embedded encryption over the historical systems.
  • Compatibility: There are longer key and slower performing PQC algorithms.
  • Competency: The available developers with skills in lattice-based cryptographic and multivariate cryptographic systems are few.

But we also have the early adopters leading the way. An example is that in 2023 JPMorgan Chase were collaborating with IBM Research in the development of a quantum-resistant blockchain which will facilitate secure cross-border transactions. On the same note: Germany BSI initiated a national-scale pilot over its digital identity systems, making it one of the leaders in quantum preparation.

Real-World Analogy: The Y2K of Cryptography

Do you recall the hyped up hype before Y2K? Enterprises hastily patched a date bug that was able to break banks, airlines, and infrastructure. It is the same situation today-just the threat is grander and the solution more intricacy. Organizations face a challenge that is substantially larger than simply flipping a few lines of COBOL code: they must locate and replace every cryptographic handshake, certificate, and digital signature protocol woven into their systems.

QuantumShield cybersecurity strategist Lena Hoffman has dubbed it as accurately as anyone: Y2K on steroids. And she is right at that.

Hybrid Systems & Future-Proofing: A Middle Ground

To be on the safer side, some organizations consider alternatives, i.e., hedge bets on hybrid systems, i.e., combine classical encryption (such as RSA) with PQC algorithms to secure a two-layers protection. Through this plan we can implement it gradually without destroying the infrastructure that is there. In 2024, a large content delivery network, Cloudflare, launched hybrid key exchange mechanisms and began to sell quantum-safe TLS to enterprise customers.

Being a person who has worked with fintechs, trying to match the requirements of PCI compliance and cryptographic audits, I experienced the behaviour of security upgrading first-hand as the problem of tomorrow. Post-quantum preparedness should not be in that category. It is no improvement, it is a survival strategy.

Final Thought: Waiting for Standards Might Be Too Late

Well, cut it out. Quantum computing has taken off. By the time that the machines are decrypting live data, it will be too late to retrofit our defenses. We have a small time-frame where we have an opportunity to shore up our digital ecosystems when it comes to such an attack, perhaps that is five to seven years.

PQC is not hyped. And it is not an overengineering. The seatbelt that we are going to wished that we had buckled ourselves on when quantum impact is at full throttle.

The actual question then is this:
Will the future plasticise the past… or will we at last stop faffing about and encode it properly?

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